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Abstract. The topic of insolvency risk in connection with life insurance companies has
recently attracted a great deal of attention. In this paper, the question is investigated of
how the value of the equity and of the liability of a life insurance company are a®ected
by the default risk and the choice of the relevant bankruptcy procedure. As an exam-
ple, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code with Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures is
used. Grosen and J¿rgensen's (2002) contingent claim model, implying only a Chapter 7
bankruptcy procedure, is extended to allow for more general bankruptcy procedures such
as Chapter 11. Thus, more realistically, default and liquidation are modelled as distin-
guishable events. This is realized by using so{called standard and cumulative Parisian
barrier option frameworks. It is shown that these options have appealing interpretations
in terms of the bankruptcy mechanism. Furthermore, a number of representative numer-
ical analyses and comparative statics are performed in order to investigate the e®ects of
di®erent parameter changes on the values of the insurance company's equity and liability,
and hence on the value of the life insurance contract. To complete the analysis, the short-
fall probabilities of the insurance company implied by the proposed models are computed
and compared.
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11. Introduction
The topic of insolvency risk in connection with life insurance companies has recently
attracted a great deal of attention. Since the 1980s a long list of defaulted life insurance
companies in Europe, Japan and the United States has been reported. A few examples
from the United States are First Farwest Corp., Integrated Resource Life Insurance Co.
and Paci¯c Standard Life Insurance Co. in 1989, Mutual Security Life Insurance Co. in
1990, First Executive Life Insurance Co. (this constituted the 12th largest bankruptcy
in the United States in the period 1980{2005), First Stratford Life Insurance Co., Exec-
utive Life Insurance Company of New York, Fidelity Bankers Life Insurance Co., First
Capital Life Insurance Co., Mutual Bene¯t Life Insurance Co. and Guarantee Security
Life Insurance Co. in 1991, Fidelity Mutual Life Insurance Co. in 1992, Summit National
Life Insurance Co., Monarch Life Insurance Co. and Confederation Life Insurance Co. in
1994, ARM Financial Group in 1999, Penn Corp. Financial Group in 2000, Conseco Inc.
in 2002 (this constituted the 3rd largest bankruptcy in the United States in the period
1980{2005)
1 and Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities in 2004.
2 Table 1 provides more de-
tailed information on the bankruptcy procedure and the number of days spent in default
for some exemplary bankruptcies of life insurance companies in the United States.
3
In Japan, the following life insurance carriers defaulted: Nissan Mutual Life in 1997,
Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance Co. and Kyoei Life Insurance Co. in 2000 and Tokyo
Mutual Life Insurance in 2001. In Europe, there were the following most noticeable insol-
vency cases: Garantie Mutuelle des Fonctionnaires in France in 1993, the world's oldest
life insurer Equitable Life (in the end only saved by a House of Lords' ruling) in the
United Kingdom in 2000 and Mannheimer Leben (failed a fair value based solvency test,
but recovered) in Germany in 2003. As the biggest corporate bankruptcy in Australia,
HIH Insurance defaulted in 2001, mainly because of the inability to correctly estimate its
liabilities (see J¿rgensen (2004)).
Hence, it is worth having a close look at the bankruptcy procedures. We take the United
States' Bankruptcy Code as an example. Similar bankruptcy laws are also applied in Japan
and in France. In the U.S. Bankruptcy Code there are two possible procedures: Chapter 7
and Chapter 11 bankruptcy. It is generally assumed that a ¯rm is in ¯nancial distress when
the value of its assets is lower than the default threshold. With Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the
¯rm is liquidated immediately after default, i.e., no renegotiations or reorganizations are
1Data taken from http://www.bankruptcydata.com.
2The life insurance insolvency cases up to 1994 are taken from the 1999 Special Comment \Life After
Death" by Moody's Investors Service, Global Credit Research, available at http://www.moodys.com. The
other cases are taken from the source mentioned in Footnote 1.
3These data are taken from Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database,
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/index.htm.
2American defaulted companies Year Bankruptcy code Days spent in default
Executive Life Insurance Co. 1991 Ch. 11 462
First Capital Life Insurance Co. 1991 Ch. 11 1669
Monarch Life Insurance Co. 1994 Ch. 11 392
ARM Financial Group 1999 Ch. 11 245
Penn Corp. Financial Group 2000 Ch. 11 119
Conseco Inc. 2002 Ch. 11 266
Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities 2004 Ch. 11 n/a
Table 1. Some defaulted insurance companies in the United States.
possible. With Chapter 11 bankruptcy, ¯rst the reality of the ¯nancial distress is checked
before the ¯rm is de¯nitively liquidated, i.e., the defaulted ¯rm is granted some \grace" pe-
riod during which a renegotiation process between equity and debt holders may take place
and the ¯rm is given the chance to reorganize. If, during this period, the ¯rm is unable to
recover then it is liquidated. Hence, the ¯rm's asset value can cross the default threshold
without causing an immediate liquidation. Thus, the default event is only signalled. For
the above mentioned cases from the United States for which data were available, all of the
life insurance companies ¯led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and the \grace" period lasted
from 119 days up to 1669 days. Such a bankruptcy procedure with a given \grace" period
does not only exist in the United States, but also in Japan and in France. In France, a
legal 3{month observation period before a possible liquidation is systematically granted
to ¯rms in ¯nancial distress by the courts. This period can be renewed once and can be
exceptionally prolonged in the limit of six months. As these examples show, it is important
to consider bankruptcy procedures that are explicitly based on the time spent in ¯nancial
distress and to include such a \grace" period into the model if one wants to capture the
e®ects of an insurance company's default risk on the value of its liabilities and on the value
of the insurance contracts more realistically.
In the present article, we construct a contingent claim model along the lines of Briys
and de Varenne (1994, 1997) and Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) for the valuation of the
equity and the liability of a life insurance company where the liability consists only of the
policy holder's payments. Their main contribution is to explicitly consider default risk in a
contingent claim model to value the equity and the liability of a life insurance company. In
Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997), default can only occur at the maturity date, whereas in
Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) default can occur at any time before the maturity date, i.e.,
they introduce the risk of a premature default to the valuation of a life insurance contract4.
In order to model the default event, they build into the model a regulatory mechanism in
4Bernard et al. (2005a) recently extended this model by taking into account stochastic interest rates.
3the form of an intervention rule, i.e., they add a simple knock{out barrier option feature
to the di®erent components of the insurance contract. The default event is de¯ned so that
the value of the total assets of the life insurance company must always be su±cient to cover
the life insurance policy holder's initial deposit compounded with the guaranteed rate of
return. Otherwise the ¯rm defaults and is immediately liquidated. Absolute priority is
assumed, i.e., the holder of the life insurance contract (= liability holder) has the ¯rst
claim on the ¯rm's assets. This corresponds to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy procedure, where
default and liquidation times coincide.
However, as we have explained above, Grosen and J¿rgensen's (2002) approach to mod-
elling the insolvency risk does not re°ect the reality well. Default and liquidation cannot
be considered as equivalent events. We therefore extend their model in order to be able
to capture the e®ects of the Chapter 11 (or of the other countries' codes corresponding to
Chapter 11) bankruptcy procedure and to study the impact of a delayed liquidation on
the valuation of the insurance company's liabilities and on the ex{ante pricing of the life
insurance contracts. We do this by using so{called Parisian barrier option frameworks.
Here we distinguish between two kinds of Parisian barrier options: standard Parisian bar-
rier options and cumulative Parisian barrier options.
Assume, we are interested in the modelling of a Parisian down{and{out option. With
standard Parisian barrier options, the option contract is knocked out if the underlying as-
set value stays consecutively below the barrier for a time longer than some predetermined
time d before the maturity date. With cumulative Parisian barrier options, the option
contract is terminated if the underlying asset value spends until maturity in total at least
d units of time below the barrier. In a corporate bankruptcy framework these two Parisian
barrier options have appealing interpretations. Think of the idea that a regulatory au-
thority takes its bankruptcy ¯ling actions according to a hypothetical default clock. In
the case of standard Parisian barrier options, this default clock starts ticking when the
asset price process breaches the default barrier and the clock is reset to zero if the ¯rm
recovers from the default. Thus, successive defaults are possible until one of these defaults
lasts d units of time. One may say that in this case the default clock is memoryless, i.e.,
earlier defaults which may last a very long time but not longer than d do not have any
consequences for eventual subsequent defaults. In the case of cumulative Parisian barrier
options, the default clock is not reset to zero when a ¯rm emerges from default, but it
is only halted and restarted when the ¯rm defaults again. Here d denotes the maximum
authorized total time in default until the maturity of the debt. This corresponds to a
full memory default clock, since every single moment spent in default is remembered and
4a®ects further defaults by shortening the maximum allowed length of time that the com-
pany can spend in default without being liquidated.5 Thus, in the limiting case when d is
set equal to zero (or is going to zero), we are back in the model of Grosen and J¿rgensen
(2002). Our model therefore encompasses that of Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) and also
those of Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997). Both kinds of Parisian options are of course
not new in the literature on exotic options. They have been introduced by Chesney et al.
(1997) and subsequently developed further in Hugonnier (1999), Moraux (2002), Anderluh
and van der Weide (2004) and Bernard et al. (2005b).
There are two related papers in the credit risk literature analyzing the e®ects of bank-
ruptcy procedures: Moraux (2003) extends the model of Black and Cox (1976) and models
the value of debt and equity of a company in a structural model of credit risk when the
default barrier is not an absorbing one. He is mainly concerned with valuing various forms
of debt and analyzes the obtained credit spreads. Fran» cois and Morellec (2004) perform a
similar analysis in a time{independent framework extending Leland's (1994) model. How-
ever, these authors are more interested in credit spreads, debt subordination or agency
con°icts. Bernard et al. (2005c) consider a model of bank deposit insurance with Parisian
options.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2, we brie°y review
the model of Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) because we will place our model in almost the
same basic setup. Moreover, we already introduce the standard Parisian barrier feature
along the lines of Chesney et al. (1997). In the numerical analysis, in order to invert the
Laplace transforms involved, we use the procedure introduced by Bernard et al. (2005b).
Hence we are able to obtain approximate solutions for the components of the life insurance
company's balance sheet and for the issued equity{linked life insurance contract. In the
case of the cumulative Parisian barrier feature, we deduce quasi{closed{form solutions for
the di®erent components of the life insurance company's liabilities and the life insurance
contract following and extending Hugonnier (1999) and Moraux (2002). In Section 3, we
perform a number of representative numerical analyses and comparative statics for both
cases in order to investigate the e®ects of di®erent parameter changes on the value of the
insurance company's equity and liability, and hence on the life insurance contract. In par-
ticular, we study the impact of the new regulation parameter d and compare it with the
old regulation parameter ´ which determines the barrier level. In Section 4, we calculate
the shortfall probabilities for both standard and cumulative Parisian options in order to
analyze the incentives for the customers to engage in a life insurance contract in this model
framework. Section 5 concludes.
5The real life bankruptcy procedures lie somewhere in between these two extreme cases.
52. Model
This section mainly consists of two parts. The ¯rst part reviews the basic model of
Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) succinctly, and more importantly, the Parisian barrier option
features are introduced to describe the di®erent default and liquidation events. Accord-
ingly, the rebate payment used by the above mentioned authors has to be altered because
it does not make sense in our framework. The remaining part of this section focuses on
the valuation of the life insurance company's equity and liability and of the issued life
insurance contract.
2.1. Contract Speci¯cation. As in the original work of Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002),
which is an extension of the early models merging default risk and life insurance contracts
of Briys and de Varenne (1994, 1997), we assume that at time t = 0 the insurance company
owns a capital structure as illustrated in the following balance sheet:
Assets Liabilities
A0 E0 ´ (1 ¡ ®)A0
L0 ´ ®A0
A0 A0
That is, for simplicity, we suppose that the representative policy holder (also liability
holder) whose premium payment at the beginning of the contract constitutes the liability
of the insurance company, denoted by L0 = ®A0, ® 2 [0;1], and the representative equity
holder, whose equity is accordingly denoted by E0 = (1 ¡ ®)A0, form a mutual company,
the life insurance company. Through their initial investments in the company, both acquire
a claim on the ¯rm's assets for a payo® at maturity (or before maturity).
The following notations are used for the speci¯cation of the insurance contract:
T := the maturity date
LT = L0egT := the guaranteed payment to the policy holder at maturity, where g is
the minimum guaranteed interest rate
At := the value of the ¯rm's assets at time t 2 [0;T]
± := the participation rate, i.e., to which extent the policy holder participates
in the ¯rm's surpluses at maturity.
Since an interest rate guarantee and the contribution principle which entitles the policy
holder to a participation in the insurer's investment surpluses are common features of to-
day's life insurance contracts, we consider the following simpli¯ed version of a participating
life insurance contract incorporating all these features. The total payo® to the holder of
such an insurance contract at maturity, ÃL(AT), is given by:
6ÃL(AT) = ±[®AT ¡ LT]
+ + LT ¡ [LT ¡ AT]
+:
This payment consists of three parts: a bonus (call option) paying to the policy holder a
fraction ± of the positive di®erence of the actual performance of his share in the insurance
company's assets and the guaranteed amount at maturity, a guaranteed ¯xed payment
which is the initial premium payment compounded by the interest rate guarantee and a
short put option resulting from the fact that the equity holder has a limited liability. In




is o®ered to the liability holder in the case of a premature closure of the ¯rm, where ¿
denotes the liquidation date. Analogously, the total payo® to the equity holder at maturity
ÃE(AT), is given by:
ÃE(AT) = [AT ¡ LT]
+ ¡ ±[®AT ¡ LT]
+:
This payment consists of two call options: a long call option on the assets with strike
equal to the promised payment at maturity, called the residual call, and a short call option
o®setting exactly the bonus call option of the liability holder. For the equity holder a
rebate is o®ered, too, in the case of a premature liquidation of the ¯rm:
£E(¿) = maxf(´ ¡ 1);0gL0e
g¿:
Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) model their regulatory intervention rule in the form of a
boundary, i.e., an exponential barrier Bt = ´L0egt is imposed on the underlying asset value
process, where ´ is a regulation parameter. When the asset price reaches this boundary,
namely, A¿ = B¿ with ¿ 2 [0;T], the company defaults and is liquidated immediately, i.e.,
default and liquidation coincide. If the regulatory authority chooses ´ ¸ 1, in the case of
a liquidation, the liability holder obtains his initial deposit plus the accrued guaranteed
interest up to the liquidation date. If an ´ < 1 is chosen, no such payment can be made to
the full extent. Obviously, the speci¯ed contract contains standard down{and{out barrier
options. Therefore the requirement A0 > B0 = ´L0 must be satis¯ed initially. It should
be noted that in the case of a liquidation, any recovered funds will be distributed to the
company's stake holders according to the usual procedure. The liability holder enjoys ab-
solute priority, i.e., he has the ¯rst claim on the company's assets.
The bankruptcy procedure described above where default and liquidation occur at the
same time corresponds to Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. As mentioned in the
introduction, we generalize the model of Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) in order to allow for
7Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This can be realized by adding a Parisian barrier option feature
instead of the standard knock{out barrier option feature to the model. Before we come to
this point, we have to make a small change on the rebate term of the issued contract. Both
Parisian barrier option features could lead to the result that at the liquidation time the
asset price falls far below the barrier value, which makes it impossible for the insurer to
o®er the above mentioned rebate. Hence, a new rebate for the liability holder is introduced
to the model and it has the form of
£L(¿) = minfL¿;A¿g;
where ¿ is the liquidation time. The rebate term implicitly depends on the regulation
parameter ´. Because of the following inequality
A¿ · B¿ = ´L¿;
it is observed that for ´ < 1, the rebate corresponds to the asset value A¿.
Correspondingly, the new rebate for the equity holder can be expressed as follows:
£E(¿) = A¿ ¡ minfL¿;A¿g = maxfA¿ ¡ L¿;0g;
i.e., the equity holder obtains the remaining asset value if there is any. Clearly, in the case
of ´ < 1, all the asset value goes to the liability holder.
In this paper, we di®erentiate between two categories of Parisian barrier features:
² Standard Parisian barrier feature: This corresponds to a procedure where the liq-
uidation of the ¯rm is declared when the ¯nancial distress has lasted successively
at least a period of length d.
² Cumulative Parisian barrier feature: This corresponds to a procedure where the
liquidation is declared when the ¯nancial distress has lasted in total at least a
period of length d during the life of the contract.
It is noted that the original model by Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) is a special case in both
scenarios described above, namely when the time window d is set to 0. Observe that with
´ # 0, we are back in the model of Briys and de Varenne (1994), because in that situation
premature default and liquidation are impossible.
2.2. Valuation. This subsection aims at valuing the liabilities of the life insurance com-
pany and of the issued life insurance contract. In the literature, di®erent methods have
been applied to value standard and cumulative Parisian options. The inverse Laplace
transform method originally introduced by Chesney et al. (1997) is adopted to price the
standard Parisian claims. The results of Hugonnier (1999) and Moraux (2002) and some
newly derived extensions are used to value the cumulative Parisian claims.
8In general, for the valuation framework, we assume a continuous{time frictionless econ-
omy with a perfect ¯nancial market, no tax e®ects, no transaction costs and no other
imperfections. Hence we can rely on martingale techniques for the valuation of the con-
tingent claim.
Under the equivalent martingale measure, the price process of the insurance company's
assets fAtgt2[0;T] is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion
dAt = At(rdt + ¾dWt);
where r denotes the deterministic interest rate, ¾ the deterministic volatility of the asset
price process fAtgt2[0;T] and fWtgt2[0;T] the equivalent Q{martingale. Solving this di®er-
ential equation, we obtain











2.2.1. Standard Parisian Barrier Framework. Before we come to the general valuation of
standard Parisian barrier options, some special cases are considered:
² At > Bt and d ¸ T ¡t: In this case, it is impossible to have an excursion below Bt,
between t and T, of length at least equal to d. Therefore, the value of a Parisian
down{and{out call just corresponds to the Black{Scholes (Black and Scholes (1973))
price of a standard European call option.
² d ¸ T: In this case the Parisian option actually becomes a standard call option.
² At > Bt and d = 0: As already mentioned, this corresponds to the scenario which
Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) introduced.
Apart from these special cases, the standard Parisian option is priced as follows. In the
standard Parisian down{and{out option framework, the ¯nal payo® ÃL(AT) is only paid
if the following technical condition is satis¯ed:
T
¡
B = infft > 0j(t ¡ g
A




B;t = supfs · tjAs = Bsg;
where gA
B;t denotes the last time before t at which the value of the assets A hits the barrier
B. T
¡
B gives the ¯rst time at which an excursion below B lasts more than d units of time.
In fact, T
¡
B is the liquidation date of the company if T
¡
B < T. It is noted that the condition
in (1) is equivalent to
T
¡
b := infft > 0j(t ¡ gb;t)1fZt<bg > dg > T
where
































i.e., Zt = Wt + mt. The following derivation enlightens this equivalence argument:
g
A
B;t = supfs · t : As = Bsg
= sup
½











= supfs · t : Zs = bg = gb;t:
Thereby we transform the event \the excursion of the value of the assets below the expo-
nential barrier Bt = ´L0egt" to the event \the excursion of the Brownian motion Zt below








". This simpli¯es the entire valuation procedure. Under
the new probability measure P the value of the assets At can be expressed as





It is well known that in a complete ¯nancial market, the price of a T{contingent claim
with the payo® Á(AT) corresponds to the expected discounted payo® under the equivalent

















Therefore, the value of the liability of the life insurance company, i.e., the price of the












































































10It is observed that the price of this contingent claim consists of four parts: A Parisian
down{and{out call option with strike
LT
®
(multiplied by ± ®), i.e., the bonus part, a
Parisian down{and{out put option with strike LT, a deterministic guaranteed part LT
which is paid at maturity when the value of the assets has not stayed below the barrier
for a time longer than d and a rebate paid immediately when the liquidation occurs.
Various approaches are applied to valuing standard Parisian products, such as Monte{
Carlo algorithms (Andersen and Brotherton{Ratcli®e (1996)), binomial or trinomial trees
(Avellaneda and Wu (1999), Costabile (2002)), PDEs (Haber et. al (2002)), ¯nite{element
methods (Stokes and Zhu (1999)) or the implied barrier concept (Anderluh and van der
Weide (2004)). In this article, we adopt the original Laplace transform approach initi-
ated by Chesney et al. (1997). Later, in the numerical analysis, for inverting the Laplace
transforms, we rely on the recently introduced and more easily implementable procedure
by Bernard et al. (2005b). They approximate the Laplace transforms needed to value
standard Parisian barrier contingent claims by a linear combination of a number of frac-
tional power functions in the Laplace parameter. The inverse Laplace transforms of these
functions are well{known analytical functions. Therefore, due to the linearity, the needed
inverse Laplace transforms are obtained by summing up the inverse Laplace transforms of
the approximate fractional power functions. In the following, we apply this technique to
each component of the liabilities and of the issued contract.
It is well known that the price of a Parisian down{and{out call option can be described
as the di®erence of the price of a plain{vanilla call option and the price of a Parisian


















































































2 dx gives the cumulative distribution function of the standard
































= 0. The density h1(T;y) is uniquely determined by inverting the


























and ¸ the parameter of Laplace transform.
The Parisian down{and{out put option can be derived by the following in{out{parity:
PDOP[A0;B0;L0;r;g] := BSP[A0;L0;r;g] ¡ PDIP[A0;B0;L0;r;g]:
Here BSP[A0;L0;r;g] gives the price of the plain{vanilla put option and PDIP[A0;B0;L0;r;g]





















Due to the di®erent possible choices of the ´{value, di®erent pricing formulas are obtained
for the Parisian down{and{in put option. An ´ < 1, which leads to the fact that the strike
























. As before, h1(T;y) and h2(T;y) are calculated by inverting the
corresponding Laplace transform. ^ h1(T;y) has the same value as before and the Laplace

























































The third term in the payo® function can be calculated as follows:
EQ[e
¡rTLT1fT¡




















As mentioned before, in the numerical analysis, we adopt the technique developed by
Bernard et al. (2005b) to invert ^ h1 and ^ h2.
In the calculation of the expected rebate, distinction of cases becomes necessary again.
For the case of ´ < 1, the liability holder will get AT¡
b if an early liquidation occurs.



































The last equality follows from the fact that T
¡
b and ZT¡
b are independent, which is shown
in the appendix of Chesney et al. (1997). Furthermore, the corresponding laws for these


































where h3(t) denotes the density of the stopping time T
¡
b . This can be calculated by














































































This can be calculated further similarly as in the case of ´ < 1. Inspired by Bernard et.
al. (2005b), we invert ^ h3 numerically in the same way.






























It is composed of three parts: A Parisian down{and{out call option with strike LT, called




by ± ®), i.e., the negative value of the liability holder's bonus option and a rebate paid
immediately when the liquidation occurs. It is noted that the second component has
already been calculated above. The ¯rst component is given by the price di®erence of
the corresponding plain{vanilla and the Parisian down{and{in option. The price of the




¡rT (AT ¡ LT)
+¤














In order to calculate the relevant Parisian down{and{in option, again two cases are dis-


























Finally, we come to the value of the equity holder's rebate. Only in the case of ´ ¸ 1, he





































Further calculations can be done analogously to the derivation of the expected rebate for
the liability holder.
2.2.2. Cumulative Parisian Barrier Framework. In this case the options are lost by their
owners when the underlying asset has stayed below the barrier for at least d units of time
during the entire duration of the contract. Therefore, the options do not lose their values









T denotes the occupation time of the process describing the value of the assets







where b and Zt are the same value or process, respectively, as in the standard Parisian







15Consequently, we obtain the present value of the liability or of the contract issued to the
policy holder in the cumulative Parisian framework:
V
C
L (A0;0) = EQ[e
¡rT ¡
±[®AT ¡ LT]

























































;B0;T ¡ d;r ¡ g) ¡ P




T <dg] + EQ[e
¡r¿ minfA¿;L¿g]:
Here, the ¯rst equality results from the equivalence of two events, i.e., the event that the
occupation time of the asset process below the barrier is shorter than d during [0;T] and
the event that the occupation time of the asset price process above the barrier is longer

















First, let us consider the cumulative Parisian down{and{out call option. According to
Hugonnier (1999) and the correction in Moraux (2002), the (r ¡ g;m) discounted price at
time 0 of a cumulative Parisian call option with maturity T, strike
L0
®
, excursion level B0,







































¹(T;k;b;T ¡ d) takes di®erent values for
di®erent cases. The only interesting case for us is b < 0, i.e. B0 < A0, and in this case
ª+






















































+ if ¹ = m + ¾




























































Second, let us consider the embedded cumulative Parisian down{and{out put option:
P




























where the put{call{symmetry is used. Furthermore, BSC is the Black{Scholes value of













































































> 0 and m2 = 1
¾(g ¡ r ¡ ¾2
2 ).
Hence, ª+















¹x°(b2;x ¡ b2;s;T ¡ s)dx
¾
:
Third, we come to the valuation of the ¯xed payment. With a close look, the discounted ex-
pected ¯xed payment under martingale measure Q is nothing but the product of e¡(r¡g)TL0
and the price of a cumulative binary option paying 1 at maturity if the occupation time
below the barrier is shorter than d. Hence, we can use the representation for the cumulative











m(T;¡1;b;T ¡ d) takes its value according to (2).
17Finally, we come to the derivation of the expected rebate payment:
EQ[e
¡r¿ minfA¿;L¿g]:




¡ (d) = infft ¸ 0;¡
¡;b
t = dg; t · T:
Here two cases are distinguished: ´ < 1 and ´ ¸ 1. First, let us look at the case of
´ < 1. In this case, the expected rebate is simpli¯ed to
EQ[e
¡r¿A¿]:






































jl ¡ bjj ¡ x + lj










where Z¿¤ = Z¿ ¡ b is a P¡Brownian motion with initial value ¡b. The ¯rst equality
results from Girsanov's theorem, and the second and third step are done by using the
argument that the law of a Brownian motion with initial value 0 staying below a negative
barrier b should be equivalent to the law of a Brownian motion with initial value ¡b staying
below the barrier value of 0. The expression in the last integral gives the joint law of a
Brownian motion with initial value ¡b > 0, the inverse of the occupation time of length d
below 0 and the local time of this Brownian motion at the level 0, which is e.g. given as
formula 1.1.5.8 in Borodin and Salminen (1996). In addition, we applied the results given
in Chapter 6.3, Section C of Karatzas and Shreve (1991). By solving the integral with
respect to the local time, we obtain the law of the Brownian motion and the inverse of the
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as before. For the equity holder we have the











¡r¿ maxfA¿ ¡ L¿;0g]:



















¹ is given in (2). Again, the value of the short bonus option can be taken from the
computations for the liability holder. Obviously, for the case of ´ < 1 the equity holder
does not obtain any rebate payment. Consequently, we just look at the value of the equity
holder's rebate when ´ ¸ 1. Since the derivation is analogous to that for the policy holder,
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In the next section, we calculate the contract for these two kinds of Parisian barrier frame-
works numerically.
2.3. Fair contract principle. A contract is called fair if the accumulated expected dis-
counted premium is equal to the accumulated expected discounted payments of the contract
under consideration. This principle requires the equality between the initial investment
of the policy holder and his expected bene¯t from the contract, namely the value of the
contract equals the initial liability
VL(A0;0) = ®A0 = L0:
Alternatively, we could also take the equity holder's point of view, since A0 = VL(A0;0)+
VE(A0;0). Then,
VE(A0;0) = (1 ¡ ®)A0 = E0:
Certainly, these equations hold for both standard and cumulative Parisian barrier claims.
3. Numerical Analysis
3.1. Fair Combination Analysis. According to the fair premium principle introduced
in Section 2.3, we can determine the fair premium implicitly through a fair combination
of the parameters. In this subsection, we mainly look at the fair combination of ± and g
given various parameter constellations. As before, we consider two cases: standard and
cumulative Parisian options.
3.1.1. Standard Parisian Barrier Framework. Again, two subcases are distinguished be-
cause di®erent relations between the strike and the barrier require di®erent valuation for-
mulas.
(a) ´ 2 [0;1] ()
L0
®
¸ L0 ¸ B0
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Figure 1. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ¾
with parameters (case (a)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80;® =
0:8; r = 0:05; ´ = 0:8; T =
12; d = 1; ¾ = 0:15(solid); ¾ =
0:20(dashing); ¾ = 0:25(thick).








Figure 2. Relation between ±
and g for di®erent T with parame-
ters (case (a)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80;® = 0:8; r = 0:05; ´ =
0:8; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; T =
12(solid); T = 18(dashing); T =
24(thick).
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Figure 3. Relation between
± and g for di®erent ´ with
parameters (case (a)): A0 =
100; L0 = 80; ® = 0:8; r =
0:05; T = 12; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; ´ =
0:7(solid); ´ = 0:8(dashing); ´ =
0:9(thick).








Figure 4. Relation between ±
and g for di®erent d with parame-
ters (case (a)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80; T = 12; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; ´ =
0:8; r = 0:05; d = 0:5(solid); d =










¸ B0 ¸ L0.
21We start our analysis with four graphics for the ¯rst subcase. The relation between the
participation rate ± and the minimum guarantee g for di®erent volatilities is demonstrated
in Figure 1. First, it is quite obvious to observe a negative relation between the partici-
pation rate and the minimum guarantee (decreasing concave curves), which results from
the fair contract principle. Similarly to Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002), for smaller values of
± (± < 0:83), either higher values of g or of ± are required for a higher volatility in order
to make the contract fair. For higher values of ± (± > 0:83), this e®ect is reversed. As
the volatility goes up, the value of Parisian down{and{out call increases, while the value
of the Parisian down{and{out put increases with the volatility at ¯rst and then decreases
(hump{shaped). The value of the ¯xed payment goes down and the rebate term behaves
similarly to the Parisian down{and{out put, i.e., goes up at ¯rst then goes down after a
certain level of volatility is reached. For the low values of ±, the ¯xed payment dominates,
therefore a positive relation between ± and ¾ (also g and ¾) is generated. On the contrary,
the reversed e®ect is observed for high values of ±. Therefore, a volatility{neutral fair
combination of (±¤;g¤) ¼ (0:83;0:033) is observed.
Figure 2 gives the relation between ± and g for di®erent maturity dates T. The value of
the Parisian down{and{out call rises with the time to maturity (positive e®ect), while the
value of the Parisian down{and{out put increases with the time to maturity for a while
then decreases (hump{shaped). For the chosen parameter values, the put value begins to
go down when the maturity time is chosen larger than 3 years. Hence, this value decreases
with T locally6 (positive e®ect). The expected value of the ¯xed payment declines when
the issued contracts have a longer duration (negative e®ect), while the expected rebate
payment increases (positive e®ect). Before a certain ± is reached, namely, ± < 0:47, the
positive e®ect dominates the negative one. The reversed e®ect is observed for ± > 0:47.
Hence, a T{neutral fair combination is also observed here. It is worth mentioning that the
magnitude of the e®ect of T is quite small, because the three curves almost overlap.
How ± (or g) changes with ´ is illustrated in Figure 3. First of all, it is noted that di®er-
ent ´{values lead to di®erent values of the barrier (B0 = ´L0). In Grosen and J¿rgensen
(2002), the liability holder bene¯ts much from a higher regulation parameter ´ because
higher values of ´ provide the liability holder a better protection against losses. The same
e®ect can also be found here. As the barrier is set higher, the values of Parisian down{and{
out call and put decrease, so does the value of ¯xed payment. In contrast, the expected
value of the rebate increases with the barrier. In all, the contract value rises when the bar-
rier is set higher. This is why the solid curve (´ = 0:7) lies above the thick one (´ = 0:9).
However, the e®ect is not as large as in the case of a standard knock{out barrier option
(the distances among these three curves are not that big) because the introduction of the
6Because the three T values applied in Figure 2 are T = 12; 18 and24, all of them are larger than
T = 3.
22Parisian barrier feature diminishes the knock{out probability (the factor d, i.e., the length
of the excursion reduces the e®ect caused by the magnitude of the barrier). This positive
e®ect of ´ (barrier) on the contract value becomes more obvious when the length of ex-
cursion d is smaller. Apparently, the adjustment of the parameter d has a considerable
impact on the e®ect of ´. Therefore, the regulator controls the strictness of the regulation
by adjusting these two parameters. Later, Tables 2{4 will show a more intuitive e®ect of
these two parameters.
The last ¯gure for the ¯rst case exhibits how the contract value changes with the length
of excursion d. Since it is the main concern of this paper to capture the e®ect of d, three
tables are listed (Tables 2{4) for this purpose. Table 2 helps to understand the following
argument. Obviously, a positive relation exists between the Parisian down{and{out call
and the length of excursion (positive e®ect). The longer the allowed excursion, the larger
the value of the option. In fact, the value of the call does not change much with the length
of excursion when a certain level of d is reached, i.e., the value of the Parisian down{and{
out call is a concave increasing function of d. The put option changes with the length of
excursion in a similar way. It increases with d but the extent to which it increases becomes
smaller after a certain level of d is reached. The ¯xed payment arises only when the asset
price process does not stay below the barrier for a time longer than d. Hence, as the size of
d goes up, the probability that the ¯xed payment will become due increases. Consequently
the expected value of the ¯xed payment rises. Its magnitude is bounded from above by
the payment LTe¡rT. In contrast, the rebate payment appears only when the considered
insurance company is liquidated, i.e., when the asset price process stays below the barrier
for a time period which is longer than d. Therefore, the longer the length of excursion, the
smaller the expected rebate payment. To sum up, the entire contract value diminishes with
the length of excursion, i.e., the contract can only remain fair when a high d is combined
with a high participation rate or a high minimum interest rate guarantee.
The same ¯gures are provided for case (b) where the barrier value is larger than L0.
Since most of the graphics are similar to those of case (a), we do not want to repeat
all the details. However, some further di®erences are discovered when the e®ect of d on
the contract value is considered. In comparison with case (a), the length of excursion d
shows a bigger e®ect here (the curves are more distant here). In case (b), the Parisian
down{and{out call option exhibits considerably smaller values for very small values of
d. This fact becomes especially evident for d near zero, since the barrier level is much
higher in the present case (barrier ¸ L0) than in case (a) (barrier < L0). It is well known
that higher barriers lead to lower prices for down{and{out options (negative e®ect). If
smaller values of d are used, this negative e®ect of the barrier cannot be reduced or even
o®set by the positive e®ect of d. Second, an extraordinarily small value of the expected
¯xed payment and on the contrary an extraordinary big value of the expected rebate are
23Relation between the participation rate and the minimum guaranteed
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Figure 5. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ¾
with parameters (case (b)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80;® =
0:8; r = 0:05; ´ = 1:2; T =
12; d = 1; ¾ = 0:15(solid); ¾ =
0:20(dashing); ¾ = 0:25(thick).








Figure 6. Relation between ±
and g for di®erent T with parame-
ters (case (b)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80;® = 0:8; r = 0:05; ´ =
1:2; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; T =
12(solid); T = 18(dashing); T =
24(thick).
observed for d close to zero. Altogether, very small values of d, say close to zero, combined
with high barrier levels cause small contract values. This is the reason why a relatively
more pronounced e®ect of d results for the case of ´ ¸ 1 (c.f. Tables 3{4).
3.1.2. Cumulative Parisian Barrier Framework. As for the standard Parisian barrier op-
tions discussed above, in the cumulative Parisian option framework, a negative relation
between the participation rate and the minimum interest rate guarantee is observed. Due
to the fact that di®erent ´{values require the use of di®erent valuation formulas, again two
subcategories can be distinguished: (a) ´ 2 [0;1] (,
L0
®







¸ B0 ¸ L0). For each of these subcategories, four ¯gures are plotted. We illustrate
how the participation rate and the minimum interest rate guarantee (± andg) change with
the volatility (¾), the maturity date (T), the regulation parameter (´) and the length of
excursion (d). Since most of the results are similar to the standard Parisian option case,
we only discuss the points where we observe di®erences. In the following we ¯rst consider
category (a).
Overall, it is observed that in this case the resulting values for the fair participation
rate are slightly smaller than those in the standard Parisian option case. Although this
di®erence can hardly be seen in the graphics, it is observable in Tables 2{4. It is justi¯ed
as follows. The cumulative Parisian down{and{out call, the down{and{out put and the
¯xed payment assume smaller values than the corresponding standard Parisian contingent
24Relation between the participation rate and the minimum guaranteed
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Figure 7. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ´
with parameters (case (b)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80; ® =
0:8; r = 0:05; T = 12; ¾ =
0:2; d = 1; ´ = 1:1(solid); ´ =
1:15(dashing); ´ = 1:2(thick).








Figure 8. Relation between ±
and g for di®erent d with parame-
ters (case (b)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80; T = 12; ¾ = 0:25; ´ =
1:2;r = 0:05; ® = 0:8; d =
0:5(solid); d = 1(dashing); d = 2
(thick).
claims. This is due to the fact that the knock{out probability becomes higher in the cu-
mulative case, given the same parameters. This is quite obvious because the knock{out
condition for standard Parisian barrier options is that the underlying asset stays consecu-
tively below barrier for a time longer than d before the maturity date, while the knock{out
condition for cumulative Parisian barrier options is that the underlying asset value spends
until the maturity in total d units of time below the barrier. In contrast, the expected cu-
mulative rebate part of the payment assumes larger values, because it is contingent on the
reversed condition compared to the other three parts of the payment. Moreover, (usually)
the total e®ect of these other parts together dominates that of the rebate.
Figure 9 depicts how the participation rate ± (or the minimum guarantee g) varies with
the volatility. The ¯gure is very similar to Figure 1. The fair combinations of g and ± for
di®erent maturity dates T are plotted in Figure 10, which resembles Figure 2.
How the regulation parameter ´ in°uences the fair combination of ± and g is demon-
strated in Figure 11. In contrast to the standard Parisian case (Figure 3), ´ has a bigger
impact on the fair parameter combination: the di®erences of the three curves are more
pronounced. Intuitively, it is clear that the value of cumulative Parisian barrier options
depends more on the magnitude of the barrier than the value of standard Parisian barrier
options does.
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Figure 9. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ¾
with parameters (case (a)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80;® =
0:8; r = 0:05; ´ = 0:8; T =
12; d = 1; ¾ = 0:15(solid); ¾ =
0:20(dashing); ¾ = 0:25(thick).







Figure 10. Relation between
± and g for di®erent T with
parameters (case (a)): A0 =
100; L0 = 80;® = 0:8; r =
0:05; ´ = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; T =
12(solid); T = 18(dashing); T =
24(thick).
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Figure 11. Relation between
± and g for di®erent ´ with
parameters (case (a)): A0 =
100; L0 = 80; ® = 0:8; r =
0:05; T = 12; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; ´ =
0:7(solid); ´ = 0:8(dashing); ´ =
0:9(thick).







Figure 12. Relation between
± and g for di®erent d with para-
meters (case (a)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80; T = 12; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; ´ =
0:8; r = 0:05; d = 0:5(solid); d =
1(dashing); d = 2(thick).
Figure 12 illustrates the e®ect of the length of excursion d on the fair combination of ±
and g. As in the standard Parisian case (c.f. Figure 4), the parameter d does not show
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Figure 13. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ¾
with parameters (case (b)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80;® =
0:8; r = 0:05; ´ = 1:2; T =
12; d = 1; ¾ = 0:15(solid); ¾ =
0:20(dashing); ¾ = 0:25(thick).







Figure 14. Relation between
± and g for di®erent T with
parameters (case (b)): A0 =
100; L0 = 80;® = 0:8; r =
0:05; ´ = 1:2; ¾ = 0:2; d = 1; T =
12(solid); T = 18(dashing); T =
24(thick).
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Figure 15. Relation be-
tween ± and g for di®erent ´
with parameters (case (b)):
A0 = 100; L0 = 80; ® =
0:8; r = 0:05; T = 12; ¾ =
0:2; d = 1; ´ = 1:1(solid); ´ =
1:15(dashing); ´ = 1:2(thick).







Figure 16. Relation between
± and g for di®erent d with para-
meters (case (b)): A0 = 100; L0 =
80; T = 12; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; ´ =
1:2; r = 0:05; d = 0:5(solid); d =
1(dashing); d = 2(thick).
a big in°uence (but bigger than in the standard Parisian case) on the fair combination of
± and g. All four parts of the payment change with d similarly to the standard Parisian
27case, namely the cumulative Parisian down{and{out call, the cumulative Parisian down{
and{out put and the expected ¯xed payment go up when d is increased (positive e®ect).
The opposite is true for the rebate part (negative e®ect). However, the magnitude of the
changes in the values is bigger.
Figures 13{16 are plotted for the case where ´ 2 [1;
1
®
]. This parameter choice leads to a
considerably higher barrier level, which reduces the values of the cumulative Parisian down{
and{out call, the cumulative Parisian down{and{out put and of the expected payment to
a big extent and increases the expected rebate part (c.f. Tables 2{4). Since Figures 13{16
are quite similar to Figures 5{8, we do not discuss them in detail.
3.2. Value Decomposition For Fair Contracts. In the above numerical analysis, it
could be noticed that the choice of the ´{parameter in°uences the e®ect of d. In the
following, the separate e®ect of d and ´ is analyzed through some tables. In Tables 2{4 it
is investigated how the fair participation rate and the di®erent components of the liability
holder's and the equity holder's payo® change with the length of excursion d for di®erent
´{values. Since we do not want to repeat the results of the last subsection, we just mention
several important aspects and concentrate on the liability holder's claims. First, assume
that the regulation parameter is set to be zero, which results in a barrier level of zero. It
then follows that the length of excursion d has no e®ect on the components of the liability
holder's payo®, because the asset price can never hit the barrier in this situation due to
the log{normal assumption of the asset dynamics. That means, the insurance company
never defaults and hence is never liquidated. Then we are back in the standard call and
put case. Therefore, we obtain the same values for the standard and cumulative Parisian
option, and also for Grosen and J¿rgensen's (2002) case. Second, except in this extreme
case, smaller participation rates result from the cumulative Parisian option framework
than from the standard Parisian modelling given the same parameters. Obviously, for the
same parameters, the cumulative down{and{out contingent claims exhibit smaller values
than the standard Parisian ones. Third, we emphasize here that the e®ect of ´ is twofold.
On the one hand, an increase in ´ leads to a rise of barrier level, which accelerates the
default of the company, especially when d is set to a small value. On the other hand,
a larger expected rebate results from a higher ´. Finally, we summarize how di®erent
combinations of d and ´ a®ect the di®erent components of the liability holder's payo®. If
small ´'s (´ = 0:8or0:9) are combined with long d's (e.g. d = 5), the probability that
the ¯rm defaults before the maturity date is small. Hence, very high bonus values, very
high expected ¯xed payments and very small rebate values are observed. As the barrier
level rises gradually, the default probability climbs up, and so does the expected rebate.
However, in the other extreme case, where high barrier levels (e.g. for the cases ´ = 1:1
and ´ = 1:2) are combined with a very short length of excursion (say d = 0:25 in a 20{year
28contract), relatively small bonus values, small ¯xed payments and relatively large expected
rebate payments result.
4. Shortfall Probability
Until now we have not raised the question of how attractive the issued contract is to the
liability holder. The liability holder might be interested in getting to know with exactly
what probability he will get the rebate payment at the liquidation time instead of the
contract value at the maturity date. Therefore, in this section, we would like to have a
look at the shortfall probability, i.e., the probability of an early liquidation (liquidation
occurs before the maturity date).
Obviously, it only makes sense to consider the shortfall probability under the subjective
probability measure, under which the assets are assumed to evolve as follows:
dAt = At(¹dt + ¾df Wt)
where ¹ > 0 is the instantaneous expected return of the asset and f Wt is a martingale
under the subjective measure. In the case of the standard Parisian framework, the shortfall
probability is given by
e P
SF = e P(T
¡
B = infft > 0jt ¡ g
A













with ~ m = 1
¾(¹ ¡ g ¡ 1
2¾2).
In case of the cumulative Parisian framework, the shortfall probability is determined by
e P







































































In the above derivation, Equation (12) of Tak¶ acs (1996) is applied. In Table 5, several
shortfall probabilities are calculated for both standard and cumulative Parisian frame-
works. First, apparently, shortfall occurs with a higher probability in the case of cumula-
tive than in that of standard Parisian options. This is due to the fact that the knock{out
29´ = 0 ) Barrier = 0
d ± BO SP CFP RL VL RC SBO RE VE
GJ 0.951 41.49 -5.39 43.90 0.00 80.00 61.49 -41.49 0.00 20.00
PA 0-T 0.951 41.49 -5.39 43.90 0.00 80.00 61.49 -41.49 0.00 20.00
CP 0-T 0.951 41.49 -5.39 43.90 0.00 80.00 61.49 -41.49 0.00 20.00
´ = 0:8 ) Barrier = 64
GJ 0.836 30.91 -0.03 19.84 29.28 80.00 50.91 -30.91 0.00 20.00
PA 0 0.836 30.91 -0.03 19.84 29.28 80.00 50.91 -30.91 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.888 35.60 -0.15 24.13 20.42 80.00 55.60 -35.60 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.902 36.94 -0.23 25.83 17.46 80.00 56.94 -36.94 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.917 38.38 -0.40 28.29 13.73 80.00 58.38 -38.38 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.926 39.20 -0.57 30.23 11.14 80.00 59.20 -39.20 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.932 39.75 -0.73 31.41 9.57 80.00 59.75 -39.75 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.945 41.02 -1.94 36.46 4.46 80.00 61.02 -41.02 0.00 20.00
CP 0 0.836 30.91 -0.03 19.84 29.28 80.00 50.91 -30.91 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.874 34.26 -0.09 22.75 23.08 80.00 54.26 -34.26 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.886 35.41 -0.13 23.93 20.79 80.00 55.41 -35.41 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.901 36.81 -0.22 25.59 17.82 80.00 56.81 -36.81 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.910 37.72 -0.30 26.85 15.73 80.00 57.72 -37.72 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.917 38.39 -0.40 27.90 14.10 80.00 58.39 -38.39 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.938 40.39 -1.03 32.43 8.21 80.00 60.39 -40.39 0.00 20.00
´ = 0:9 ) Barrier = 72
GJ 0.743 23.87 0.00 15.23 40.90 80.00 43.87 -23.87 0.00 20.00
PA 0 0.743 23.87 0.00 15.23 40.90 80.00 43.87 -23.87 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.840 31.27 -0.04 20.14 28.63 80.00 51.27 -31.27 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.865 33.44 -0.09 21.91 24.74 80.00 53.44 -33.44 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.891 35.83 -0.20 24.23 20.24 80.00 55.83 -35.83 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.905 37.23 -0.32 26.79 16.30 80.00 57.23 -37.23 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.915 38.17 -0.44 29.10 13.17 80.00 58.17 -38.17 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.940 40.52 -1.42 33.63 7.27 80.00 60.52 -40.52 0.00 20.00
CP 0 0.743 23.87 0.00 15.23 10.90 80.00 43.87 -23.87 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.814 29.11 -0.02 18.47 32.44 80.00 49.11 -29.11 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.836 30.93 -0.04 19.78 29.32 80.00 50.93 -30.93 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.862 33.19 -0.08 21.63 25.26 80.00 53.19 -33.19 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.878 34.68 -0.13 23.03 22.42 80.00 54.68 -34.68 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.890 35.80 -0.18 24.21 20.18 80.00 55.80 -35.80 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.925 39.24 -0.63 29.30 12.09 80.00 59.24 -39.24 0.00 20.00
Table 2. Decomposition of fair contracts with A0 = 100; r =
0:05; g = 0:02; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; T = 20.
30´ = 1 ) Barrier = 80
d ± BO SP CFP RL VL RC SBO RE VE
GJ 0.569 14.50 0.00 10.71 54.79 80.00 34.50 -14.50 0.00 20.00
PA 0 0.569 14.50 0.00 10.71 54.79 80.00 34.50 -14.50 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.764 25.29 -0.01 16.19 38.53 80.00 45.29 -25.29 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.807 28.54 -0.02 18.40 33.08 80.00 48.54 -28.54 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.851 32.19 -0.09 20.26 27.64 80.00 52.19 -32.19 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.875 34.36 -0.18 21.95 23.87 80.00 54.36 -34.36 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.891 35.83 -0.28 25.99 18.46 80.00 55.83 -35.83 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.931 39.70 -0.93 29.68 11.55 80.00 59.70 -39.70 0.00 20.00
CP 0 0.569 14.50 0.00 10.71 54.79 80.00 34.50 -14.50 0.00 20.00
0.25 0.715 22.10 0.00 14.22 43.69 80.00 42.10 -22.10 0.00 20.00
0.50 0.756 24.77 -0.01 15.65 39.59 80.00 44.77 -24.77 0.00 20.00
1.00 0.801 28.12 -0.03 17.65 34.26 80.00 48.12 -28.12 0.00 20.00
1.50 0.829 30.36 -0.05 19.18 30.51 80.00 50.36 -30.36 0.00 20.00
2.00 0.848 32.05 -0.08 20.46 27.57 80.00 52.05 -32.05 0.00 20.00
5.00 0.906 37.44 -0.36 26.02 16.91 80.00 57.44 -37.44 0.00 20.00
´ = 1:1 ) Barrier = 88
GJ 0.540 9.10 0.00 6.31 64.58 80.00 22.64 -9.10 6.46 20.00
PA 0 0.540 9.10 0.00 6.31 64.58 80.00 22.64 -9.10 6.46 20.00
0.25 0.659 18.23 0.00 12.05 49.72 80.00 37.53 -18.23 0.70 20.00
0.50 0.726 22.43 0.00 14.28 43.29 80.00 42.09 -22.43 0.34 20.00
1.00 0.795 27.41 -0.02 17.32 35.27 80.00 47.26 -27.41 0.15 20.00
1.50 0.833 30.52 -0.08 19.70 29.28 80.00 50.42 -30.52 0.10 20.00
2.00 0.858 32.70 -0.18 21.73 25.57 80.00 52.64 -32.70 0.06 20.00
5.00 0.918 38.47 -0.48 28.13 13.40 80.00 58.45 -38.47 0.02 20.00
CP 0 0.540 9.10 0.00 6.31 64.58 80.00 22.64 -9.10 6.46 20.00
0.25 0.612 14.97 0.00 10.06 54.97 80.00 33.06 -14.97 1.91 20.00
0.50 0.666 18.06 0.00 11.58 50.36 80.00 36.77 -18.06 1.29 20.00
1.00 0.731 22.26 -0.01 13.72 44.03 80.00 41.44 -22.26 0.82 20.00
1.50 0.771 25.21 -0.02 15.34 39.47 80.00 44.60 -25.21 0.61 20.00
2.00 0.799 27.48 -0.03 16.71 35.84 80.00 46.99 -27.48 0.49 20.00
5.00 0.882 35.04 -0.20 22.66 22.50 80.00 54.84 -35.04 0.20 20.00
Table 3. Decomposition of fair contracts with A0 = 100; r =
0:05; g = 0:02; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; T = 20.
31´ = 1:2 ) Barrier = 96
d ± BO SP CFP RL VL RC SBO RE VE
GJ 0.514 3.16 0.00 2.07 74.77 80.00 8.21 -3.16 14.95 20.00
PA 0 0.514 3.16 0.00 2.07 74.77 80.00 8.21 -3.16 14.95 20.00
0.25 0.580 12.00 0.00 8.14 59.86 80.00 27.87 -12.00 4.13 20.00
0.50 0.645 16.20 0.00 10.53 53.27 80.00 33.94 -16.20 2.26 20.00
1.00 0.737 22.18 0.00 13.65 44.17 80.00 41.09 -22.18 1.09 20.00
1.50 0.782 25.91 -0.02 16.08 38.01 80.00 45.20 -25.91 0.71 20.00
2.00 0.818 28.83 -0.09 18.42 32.75 80.00 48.32 -28.83 0.51 20.00
5.00 0.901 36.76 -0.10 24.71 18.53 80.00 56.61 -36.76 0.15 20.00
CP 0 0.514 3.16 0.00 2.07 74.77 80.00 8.21 -3.16 14.95 20.00
0.25 0.561 9.16 0.00 6.00 64.84 80.00 21.91 -9.16 7.25 20.00
0.50 0.607 12.09 0.00 7.60 60.30 80.00 26.82 -12.09 5.28 20.00
1.00 0.677 16.57 0.00 9.85 53.58 80.00 33.04 -16.57 3.53 20.00
1.50 0.725 19.96 0.00 11.56 48.48 80.00 37.28 -19.96 2.68 20.00
2.00 0.759 22.67 -0.01 13.00 44.33 80.00 40.52 -22.68 2.16 20.00
5.00 0.862 32.24 -0.10 19.27 28.59 80.00 51.33 -32.24 0.91 20.00
Table 4. Decomposition of fair contracts with A0 = 100; r =
0:05; g = 0:02; ® = 0:8; ¾ = 0:2; T = 20.
Shortfall Probability PA Shortfall Probability CP
¾ ¹ ´ d ¹ ´ d
0:06 0:08 0:9 1:1 0:5 2 0:06 0:08 0:9 1:1 0:5 2
0:10 0:013 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:018 0:003 0:010 0:093 0:004 0:002
0:15 0:125 0:052 0:092 0:240 0:068 0:035 0:159 0:070 0:124 0:318 0:085 0:053
0:20 0:289 0:180 0:251 0:403 0:222 0:132 0:347 0:227 0:308 0:507 0:259 0:184
Table 5. Shortfall probabilities for standard and cumulative Parisian
frameworks with parameters: A0 = 100;L0 = 80; g = 0:02;T = 20; ¹ =
0:08; ¾ = 0:2; ´ = 0:8; d = 1.
condition is less demanding for the cumulative Parisian option. All the other e®ects, e.g.
that the shortfall probability increases in ¾ and ´ and decreases in ¹ and d, are quite
straightforward. Therefore, the insurance company can o®er customers with di®erent risk
aversions (willingness to accept a certain shortfall probability) di®erent insurance contracts
according to varying parameter choices.
325. Conclusion
In the present article, we extend the model of Grosen and J¿rgensen (2002) and investi-
gate the question of how to value an equity{linked life insurance contract when considering
the default risk (and the liquidation risk) under di®erent bankruptcy procedures. In or-
der to take into account the realistic bankruptcy procedure Chapter 11, these risks are
modelled in both standard and cumulative Parisian frameworks. In the numerical analysis
part, we perform several sensitivity analyses to see how the fair combinations of the par-
ticipation rate and the minimum interest rate guarantee depend on the volatility of the
company's assets, the maturity dates of the contract, the regulation parameter and the
length of excursion. In addition, due to their importance, a number of tables are given
which help to catch and to compare the e®ects of the two regulation parameters d and ´.
Furthermore, we consider how likely it is that the liability holder will obtain the rebate
payment whose size is uncertain at the point in time when the contract is signed. Based on
the analysis in Section 4, the insurance company can o®er di®erent contracts to customers
with di®erent willingness to accept certain shortfall probabilities.
33References
Anderluh, J., Van der Weide, H., 2004. Parisian options { the implied barrier
concept. Bubak, M., van Albada, G.D., Sloot, P.M.A., Dongarra, J.J. [eds.]: Com-
putational Science { ICCS 2004, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer,
851-858.
Andersen, L., Brotherton{Ratcli®e, R., 1996. Exact Exotics. Risk 9(10), 85{89.
Avellaneda, M., Wu, L., 1999. Pricing Parisian-style options with a lattice method.
International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 2(1), 1{16.
Bernard, C., Le Courtois, O., Quittard{Pinon, F., 2005a. Market value of life
insurance contracts under stochastic interest rates and default risk. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics 36, 499{516.
Bernard, C., Le Courtois, O., Quittard{Pinon, F., 2005b. A new procedure for
pricing Parisian options. The Journal of Derivatives, Summer 2005, 45{53.
Bernard, C., Le Courtois, O., Quittard{Pinon, F., 2005c. A Study of Mutual
Insurance for Bank Deposits. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review 30(2), 129{
146.
Black, F. and Cox, J.C., 1976. Valuing corporate securities: some e®ects of bond
indenture provisions. Journal of Finance, 351{367.
Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Jour-
nal of Political Economy 81, 637{654.
Borodin, A.N., Salminen, P., 1996. The Handbook of Brownian motion { facts and
formulae. BirkhÄ auser.
Briys, E., de Varenne, F., 1994. Life insurance in a contingent claim framework:
pricing and regulatory implications. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance
Theory 19, 53{72.
Briys, E., de Varenne, F., 1997. On the risk of insurance liabilities: debunking some
common pitfalls. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 64(4), 673{694.
Chesney, M., Jeanblanc{Picqu¶ e, M., Yor, M., 1997. Brownian excursions and
Parisian barrier options. Advances in Applied Probability 29, 165{184.
Costabile, M., 2002. A combinatorial approach for pricing Parisian options. Deci-
sions in Economics and Finance 25(2), 111{125.
Fran» cois, P., Morellec, E., 2004. Capital structure and asset prices: some e®ects of
bankruptcy procedures. Journal of Business 77(2), 387{412.
Grosen, A., J¿rgensen P.L., 2002. Life Insurance Liabilities at Market Value: An
Analysis of Insolvency Risk, Bonus Policy, and Regulatory Intervention Rules in a
Barrier Option Framework. The Journal of Risk and Insurance 69(1), 63{91.
Haber, R.J., SchÄ onbucher, P.J., Wilmott, P., 1999. Pricing Parisian options. The
Journal of Derivatives 6(3), 71{79.
34Hugonnier, J.N., 1999. The Feynman{Kac formula and pricing occupation time
derivatives. International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance 2(2), 153{
178.
J¿rgensen, P.L., 2004. On accounting standards and fair valuation of life insurance
and pension liabilities. Scandinavian Actuarial Journal 5, 372{394.
Karatzas, I., Shreve, S.E., 1991. Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus (2nd
Edition). Springer.
Leland, H.E., 1994. Corporate debt value, bond covenants and optimal capital
structure. Journal of Finance 49, 1213{52.
Moraux, F., 2002. On pricing cumulative Parisian options. Finance 23, 127{132.
Moraux, F., 2003. Valuing corporate liabilities when the default threshold is not
an absorbing barrier. Working Paper, Universit¶ e de Rennes 1.
Stokes, N., Zhu, Z., 1999. A ¯nite element platform for pricing path{dependent
exotic options. Proceedings of the Quantitative Methods in Finance Conference,
Australia.
Tak¶ acs, L., 1996. On a generalization of the arc{sine law. The Annals of Applied
Probability 6(3), 1035-1040.
35